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S T A T E OF U T A H UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
SGTSS. MAY 2 6 2006 
M A R K L. S H U R T L E F F 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
RATefDAePrzE pwtectinzutah • pwtectinzYm Kzizr 
May 26, 2006 
Lisa Collins 
Clerk of the Court 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
450 South State Street 
Post Office Box 140210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0210 
Re: State v. Mark and Christina Gray, Case No. 20050136-CA 
Dear Ms. Collins: 
I am writing pursuant to rule 24(j), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
to advise the Court of authority relevant to the above-referenced case that 
recently came to my attention. Two cases—State v. Halls, 2006 UT App 142, 
~p.3d— and State v. Austin, 2006 UT App 184 (Memorandum Decision 
concern the defendants' claim that the jury instruction on reasonable doubt was 
improper. A third case, State v. Terry, 2006 UT App 217 (Memorandum 
Decision), pertains to defendants' claim that their attorneys were ineffective 
for not requesting a lesser-included offense jury instruction. 
State v. Halls, 2006 UT App 142, —P.3d— (jury instruction that 
instructed the jury State must "eliminate all reasonable doubt" is proper 
because it "did not convey the message that the State must only eliminate those 
doubts that are sufficiently defined; neither did the State argue that the juror 
need articulate and eliminate specific doubts"). 
State v. Austin, 2006 UT App 184 (Memorandum Decision) (same). 
State v. Terry, 2006 UT App 217 (Memorandum Decision) (under 
"highly deferential standard of review" applicable to claims of ineffective 
assistance, defense counsel was not deficient in not requesting a lesser-
included offense instruction because "defense counsel's strategy was to 
demonstrate that the State had failed to prove that Defendant was involved in 
any crime, not that Defendant was guilty of the lesser-included charge . . . " ) . 
160 EAST 300 SOUTH, SIXTH FLOOR • P.O. 140854 • SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114-0854 • TEL: (801) 366-0180 • FAX: (801) 366-0167 
Copies of these opinions are attached for the convenience of the Court. Thank 
you for your attention to this matter. 
Very truly yours, 
BRETT J. DELPORTO 
Assistant Attorney General 
cc: Barton J. Warren, Esq. 
Vfetlaw 
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NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT 
BEEN RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION 
IN THE PERMANENT LAW REPORTS. 
UNTIL RELEASED, IT IS SUBJECT TO 
REVISION OR WITHDRAWAL. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Franklin Eric HALLS, Defendant and 
Appellant. 
No. 20040939-CA. 
April 13, 2006. 
Background: Defendant was convicted in 
the District Court, Monticello Department, 
Lyle R. Anderson, J., of unlawful possession 
of a controlled substance, unlawful 
possession of an imitation controlled 
substance, and possession of paraphernalia. 
Defendant appealed. 
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Judith M. 
Billings, J., held that: 
(1) reasonable doubt instruction correctly 
communicated to jury the principle of 
reasonable doubt, and 
(2) Court of Appeals would not review 
issue of whether trial court erred in 
enhancing defendant's sentence based on a 
prior conviction of possession of a 
controlled substance, as defendant invited 
the error. 
Affirmed. 
HI Criminal Law €^>1038.1(5) 
110kl038.1(5) Most Cited Cases 
Court of Appeals would review for plain 
error or manifest injustice, rather than for 
correctness, reasonable doubt instruction, 
which instruction defendant claimed 
violated his due process rights, in 
prosecution for drug offenses, where 
defendant did not object to instruction at 
trial. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14; Rules 
Crim.Proc, Rule 19(e). 
121 Criminal Law €=^1134(3) 
110k! 134(3) Most Cited Cases 
Whether a jury instruction correctly states 
the law is reviewable under a correction of 
error standard, with no particular deference 
given to the trial court's ruling. 
131 Criminal Law €=>l 137(2) 
110k! 137(2) Most Cited Cases 
Appellate court will not review an error 
committed at trial when defendant led the 
trial court into committing the error. 
HI Criminal Law ©=*l 137(3) 
110k! 137(3) Most Cited Cases 
Court of Appeals would not apply invited 
error doctrine to preclude appellate review 
of defendant's challenge to reasonable doubt 
instruction, though defense counsel 
expressly agreed to instruction at trial, in 
drug prosecution, as instruction given 
complied with then-current law, but that law 
changed, which colored defense counsel's 
failure to have raised an issue about 
instruction at trial. 
151 Criminal Law €^1030(1) 
110kl030(l) Most Cited Cases 
Manifest injustice or the plain error standard 
of review requires appellant to show that an 
error exists, the error should have been 
obvious to the trial court, and the error is 
harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a 
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable 
outcome for the appellant, or phrased 
© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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differently, the appellate court's confidence 
in the verdict is undermined. 
161 Criminal Law €^789(4) 
110k789(4) Most Cited Cases 
So long as the court instructs the jury on the 
necessity that defendant's guilt be proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt, the Constitution 
does not require that any particular form of 
words be used in advising the jury of the 
government's burden of proof; rather, taken 
as a whole, the instructions must correctly 
convey the concept of reasonable doubt to 
the jury. 
121 Criminal Law €^>822(16) 
110k822(16) Most Cited Cases 
Reasonable doubt instruction, which 
included phrase that state had to "eliminate 
all reasonable doubt," taken as a whole, 
correctly communicated to jury the principle 
of reasonable doubt, in drug prosecution; 
instruction did not convey message that state 
only had to eliminate those doubts that were 
sufficiently defined, and neither did state 
argue that juror needed to articulate and 
eliminate specific doubts. 
181 Criminal Law €=^1137(2) 
110k! 137(2) Most Cited Cases 
Appellate court would not review on appeal 
issue of whether trial court erred in 
enhancing defendant's sentence based on a 
prior conviction of possession of a 
controlled substance, on basis that judgment 
from prior conviction incorrectly stated that 
he pled guilty to possession with intent to 
distribute, when he had actually pled guilty 
to simple possession, as defendant invited 
the error by repeatedly stipulating to fact 
that he had a prior conviction for possession. 
121 Criminal Law €^>l 137(2) 
110k! 137(2) Most Cited Cases 
On appeal, a party cannot take advantage of 
an error committed at trial when that party 
led the trial court into committing the error. 
[101 Criminal Law €=>641.13(7) 
110k641.13(7) Most Cited Cases 
Even if defense counsel was deficient in 
counseling defendant to stipulate to his prior 
conviction for drug possession, defendant 
was not prejudiced thereby, as parties agreed 
that error in prior conviction judgment was 
simply clerical, and, thus, prior judgment 
was still final and effective for purposes of 
enhancing defendant's sentence on his drug 
convictions. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 6. 
Fill Criminal Law €==>996(1) 
110k996(l) Most Cited Cases 
A clerical error, once determined, can be 
amended and made effective as of a prior 
date so that the record accurately reflects 
that which took place. 
K. Andrew Fitzgerald, Moab, for Appellant. 
Mark L. Shurtleff, Attorney General and J. 
Frederic Voros Jr., Assistant Attorney 
General, Salt Lake City, for Appellee. 
Before Judges BENCH, GREENWOOD, 
and BILLINGS. 
OPINION 
BILLINGS, Judge: 
*1 **1 Defendant Franklin Eric Halls 
appeals from his convictions of one count of 
unlawful possession of a controlled 
substance, see Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(2)(a)(i) (Supp.2005): one count of 
unlawful possession of an imitation 
controlled substance, see Utah Code Ann. § 
58-37b-4 (2002); and one count of 
possession of paraphernalia, see Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37a-5 (2002). We affirm. 
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BACKGROUND 
**2 On March 1, 2004, Officer Jim 
Eberling of the Monticello Police 
Department and Agent Travis Clark, a 
parole officer from the Department of 
Corrections, Adult Probation and Parole, 
went to Defendant's parents' house to speak 
to Defendant about a possible hit-and-run 
accident. Upon arriving, they discovered 
that Defendant was not home and decided to 
wait for him to return from work. Shortly 
thereafter, Defendant arrived at his parents' 
home in a pickup truck driven by Jim 
Abrams. 
**3 Approaching Defendant's parents' 
home, Abrams glanced over at Defendant 
and noticed him bending over. He testified 
that it looked as if Defendant was shoving 
something under the seat. Abrams dropped 
off Defendant and left. 
**4 When Abrams arrived at his own 
home, he checked under the seat and found a 
black box containing some bags and scales. 
Upset that Defendant would hide 
paraphernalia in his truck, Abrams took the 
items he found to the police station and gave 
them to Police Chief Adair. 
**5 Meanwhile, Officer Eberling and 
Agent Clark conducted a search of 
Defendant, his bedroom, and his vehicle. 
Agent Clark accompanied Officer Eberling 
to Defendant's residence because Agent 
Clark had been having some problems with 
Defendant and because Defendant had 
recently tested positive for 
methamphetamine. After searching 
Defendant's bedroom and truck, Officer 
Eberling and Agent Clark took Defendant to 
the police station to question him regarding 
the hit-and-run accident and to possibly 
administer a urinalysis drug test. 
**6 As they arrived at the police station, 
Chief Adair was across the street searching 
Abrams's truck. Officer Eberling and Agent 
Clark took Defendant into the station for 
questioning. During questioning, Chief 
Adair knocked on the door and handed 
Officer Eberling the items found under the 
seat in Abrams's truck. Those items included 
a bag containing a white crystal substance, a 
black box containing a set of scales and a 
couple of small plastic bags, and a larger 
empty bag. Chief Adair explained to Officer 
Eberling how Abrams found these items. 
**7 Officer Eberling and Agent Clark then 
began to question Defendant regarding the 
items. Defendant first denied that the items 
belonged to him, but he eventually admitted 
that the items were his. Defendant told 
Officer Eberling and Agent Clark that the 
white crystal substance was his and that it 
was not methamphetamine, but a cutting 
agent called "MSM." Defendant stated that 
he was planning to mix the cutting agent 
into an ounce of methamphetamine so that 
he could use one ounce for free and sell the 
other. Defendant also stated that the scales 
were used to weigh the methamphetamine 
he sold and admitted that two of the small 
plastic bags had contained 
methamphetamine. Subsequent testing 
confirmed that the white crystal substance 
was not methamphetamine; the small plastic 
bags and scales tested positive for 
methamphetamine. 
*2 **8 At trial, Defendant testified that he 
did not know anything about the items found 
in Abrams's truck and denied owning them. 
Defendant stated that on the day he was 
questioned about the items found in 
Abrams's truck, he believed the police had 
pulled Abrams over, searched his truck, and 
found the contraband. Because Officer 
Eberling and Agent Clark told Defendant 
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that he was already in trouble for violating 
his parole, he decided to admit ownership of 
the contraband to protect Abrams from any 
potential punishment. 
**9 The jury found Defendant guilty of 
possession of a controlled substance, 
possession of an imitation controlled 
substance, and possession of drug 
paraphernalia. After his conviction, 
Defendant stipulated to a prior conviction of 
possession of a controlled substance for 
purposes of enhancement, even though 
Defendant's prior judgment read that he was 
convicted of possession with intent to 
distribute. The trial court indicated that there 
was a clerical error in the prior judgment, 
but that Defendant clearly had the prior 
conviction to enhance Defendant's current 
conviction to a second degree felony, 
resulting in a one- to fifteen-year sentence. 
Defendant appeals. 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
[11T21 **10 On appeal, Defendant asserts 
that the reasonable doubt jury instruction 
given at trial incorrectly stated the law and 
violated his due process rights. "Whether [a 
jury] instruction correctly states the law is 
reviewable under a correction of error 
standard, with no particular deference given 
to the trial court's ruling." State v. Archuleta, 
850 P.2d 1232, 1244 (Utah 1993). However, 
rule 19(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure provides, in pertinent part: 
"Unless a party objects to an instruction or 
the failure to give an instruction, the 
instruction may not be assigned as error 
except to avoid a manifest injustice." Utah 
R.Crim. P. 19(e). Defendant admits that he 
never objected to the reasonable doubt jury 
instruction at trial. Therefore, pursuant to 
rule 19(e), Defendant's failure to object to 
the reasonable doubt jury instruction at trial 
renders the instruction "reviewable for plain 
error, or manifest injustice, rather than for 
correctness." State v. Cruz, 2005 UT 45^ 
16, 122 P.3d 543; see also State v. Casey, 
2003 UT 55,11 40, 82P.3dll06 ("[I]n most 
circumstances [,] the term manifest injustice 
is synonymous with the plain error standard 
...." (quotations and citation omitted)). 
£3J. **11 Defendant also asserts that the 
trial court erred when it enhanced 
Defendant's sentence based on the parties' 
stipulation that Defendant had a prior 
conviction for possession, because 
Defendant's prior judgment incorrectly 
stated that the prior conviction was for 
possession with the intent to distribute. 
According to Defendant, since the prior 
judgment is not correct, it cannot be a final 
judgment for the purposes of enhancement. 
However, because Defendant invited the 
error, which he now appeals, we will not 
review it. We will not review "an error 
committed at trial when [Defendant] led the 
trial court into committing the error." State 
v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1220 (Utah 1993). 
ANALYSIS 
I. Defendant's Reasonable Doubt Jury 
Instruction 
*3 **12 Defendant asserts that the 
reasonable doubt jury instruction given at 
his trial incorrectly stated the law and 
violated the Due Process Clause of the 
United States Constitution. At Defendant's 
trial, the reasonable doubt instruction was in 
compliance with State v. Robertson, 932 
P.2d 1219 (Utah 1997), overruled in 
relevant part by State v. Reyes, 2005 UT 33, 
116 P.3d 305. It instructed the jury that 
"[t]he State must eliminate all reasonable 
doubt." However, after Defendant's trial, the 
Utah Supreme Court expressly abandoned 
the "obviate all reasonable doubt" 
requirement of the Robertson test. State v. 
Reyes, 2005 UT 33,11 30, 116 P.3d 305. 
© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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Relying on Reyes, see id^ Defendant now 
asserts that under the new standard, the 
reasonable doubt jury instruction given at 
trial violated his due process rights. 
HI **13 Rule 19(e) of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure provides, in pertinent 
part: "Unless a party objects to an 
instruction or the failure to give an 
instruction, the instruction may not be 
assigned as error except to avoid a manifest 
injustice." Utah R.Crim. P. 19(e). Because 
Defendant admits that he did not object to 
the reasonable doubt jury instruction at trial, 
"we will only remand for a new trial if the 
error ... constitutes a 'manifest injustice.' " 
TFN11 Casey, 2003 UT 55 at | 39. 82 P.3d 
1106. 
[5] **14 "[M]anifest injustice" has been 
defined as being "synonymous with the 
'plain error' standard." Id. at f 40. The 
manifest injustice or the plain error standard 
requires the appellant to show that" '(i) [a]n 
error exists; (ii) the error should have been 
obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error 
is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a 
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable 
outcome for the appellant, or phrased 
differently, our confidence in the verdict is 
undermined.' " Id at ^ 41 (quoting State y. 
Powell 872 P.2d 1027, 1031 (Utah 1994)). 
It is under this plain error standard that we 
review Defendant's appeal of the reasonable 
doubt jury instruction given at his trial. 
**15 Under the first prong of the plain 
error standard, Defendant must show that 
"[a]n error exists." Id_ Defendant asserts that 
the error in the reasonable doubt jury 
instruction given at trial is the use of the 
phrase "eliminate all reasonable doubt." In 
Reyes, the Utah Supreme Court expressly 
abandoned the phrase "obviate all 
reasonable doubt" as a requirement for a 
reasonable doubt jury instruction. 2005 UT 
33 a t f 30, 116P.3d305. For the purposes 
of this appeal, the parties do not dispute that 
"obviate all reasonable doubt" and 
"eliminate all reasonable doubt" are similar. 
However, we consider the "eliminate all 
reasonable doubt" jury instruction to be less 
troublesome than the Reyes "obviate all 
reasonable doubt" instruction. 
{61**16 In State v. Cruz, 2005 UT 45, 122 
P.3d 543, the Utah Supreme Court 
determined that Reyes effectively overruled 
the Robertson test for reasonable doubt jury 
instructions and adopted the test enunciated 
by the United States Supreme Court in 
Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 22, 114 
S.Ct. 1239, 127 L.Ed.2d 583 (1994). See 
Cruz, 2005 UT 45 at f 21, 122 P.3d 543. 
The Victor test provides: 
*4 [S]o long as the court instructs the jury 
on the necessity that the defendant's guilt 
be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the 
Constitution does not require that any 
particular form of words be used in 
advising the jury of the government's 
burden of proof. Rather, "taken as a whole, 
the instructions [must] correctly convey 
the concept of reasonable doubt to the 
jury." 
Victor, 511 U.S. at 5, 114 S.Ct. 1239 
(second alteration in original) (citations 
omitted). This overarching principle, that 
"taken as a whole, [the reasonable doubt 
jury instruction must] correctly 
communicate the principle of reasonable 
doubt" to the jury, is now the standard for 
"assessing the validity of reasonable doubt 
instructions." Cruz, 2005 UT 45 at T^ 21, 
122 P.3d 543. Therefore, if Defendant's 
reasonable doubt jury instruction, " 'taken as 
a whole, ... correctly convey[ed] the concept 
of reasonable doubt to the jury,'" id. at | 20 
(quoting Victor, 511 U.S. at 22, 114 S.Ct. 
1239), then it was not erroneous. We 
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was not in error. 
**17 The Reyes court found the "obviate 
all reasonable doubt" concept "linguistically 
opaque and conceptually suspect." 2005 UT 
33.1 26, 116 P.3d 305. The potential 
problem with the "obviate all reasonable 
doubt" requirement is that it 
contemplates a two-step undertaking: the 
identification of the doubt and a testing of 
the validity of the doubt against the 
evidence.... The "beyond a reasonable 
doubt" standard does not, however, 
condition a conclusion that a doubt is 
reasonable on an ability either to articulate 
the doubt or to state a reason for it. 
Id at 1 27. Therefore, "ft]o the extent that 
the Robertson 'obviate' test would permit the 
State to argue that it need only obviate 
doubts that are sufficiently defined, the test 
works to improperly diminish the State's 
burden." Id. at 1f 28 (emphasis added). 
Essentially, the obviate test's "substantial 
risk of causing a juror to find guilt based on 
a degree of proof below beyond a reasonable 
doubt," id. at 1 30, comes from its potential 
to allow the State to argue that a juror must 
articulate and obviate specific doubts. 
**18 This is not the situation here. The 
trial court's jury instruction stated: 
A defendant is presumed innocent until 
proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
This presumption follows the defendant 
throughout the trial. If a defendant's guilt 
is not shown beyond a reasonable doubt, 
the defendant should be acquitted. 
The [S]tate must eliminate all reasonable 
doubt. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is 
not proof to an absolute certainty. 
Reasonable doubt is a doubt based on 
reason, which is reasonable in view of all 
the evidence. Reasonable doubt is not a 
doubt based on fancy, imagination, or 
wholly speculative possibility. Proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt is enough proof 
to satisfy the mind, or convince the 
understanding of those bound to act 
conscientiously, and enough to eliminate 
reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt is a 
doubt that reasonable people would 
entertain based upon the evidence in the 
case. 
*5 [7] **19 This reasonable doubt jury 
instruction given at Defendant's trial did not 
convey the message that the State must only 
eliminate those doubts that are sufficiently 
defined; neither did the State argue that the 
juror need articulate and eliminate specific 
doubts. Instead, the jury instruction, "taken 
as a whole, correctly communicate[d] the 
principle of reasonable doubt" to the jury. 
Cruz, 2005 UT 45 at 1 21, 122 P.3d 543, 
**20 Although the language "obviate all 
reasonable doubt" has been abandoned by 
Reyes, see 2005 UT 33 at f 34, 116 P.3d 
305, we are not persuaded that the use of 
"eliminate all reasonable doubt" in 
Defendant's jury instruction constitutes 
manifest injustice because the reasonable 
doubt jury instruction "correctly 
communicate [d] the principle of reasonable 
doubt" to the jury. Stale v. Cruz, 2005 UT 
45,1 21, 122P.3d543. [FN21 Therefore, we 
do not remand for a new trial. 
II. Defendant's Sentence Enhancement 
**21 Defendant also claims that the trial 
court erred when it enhanced his sentence 
based on a prior conviction of possession of 
a controlled substance, even though 
Defendant stipulated to the prior conviction. 
Essentially, Defendant argues that because 
the judgment from his first conviction for 
possession incorrectly stated that he pleaded 
guilty to possession with intent to distribute, 
when he actually only pleaded to simple 
© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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possession, the judgment is ineffectual. 
[81T91 **22 Defendant repeatedly 
stipulated to the fact that he had a prior 
conviction for possession, thereby inviting 
the error he now appeals. M[0]n appeal, a 
party cannot take advantage of an error 
committed at trial when that party led the 
trial court into committing the error." State 
v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1220 (Utah 1993). 
After jury selection, counsel for Defendant 
told the trial court that if the jury found 
Defendant guilty, Defendant would stipulate 
to a prior conviction for possession. Defense 
counsel also explained that the prior 
judgment contained a clerical error, but that 
Defendant was still willing to stipulate to the 
prior conviction. Moreover, after Defendant 
was found guilty, Defendant again stipulated 
to the prior conviction for possession. When 
the trial court asked if there was "[a]ny legal 
reason why sentence should not be 
pronounced," counsel for Defendant replied, 
"None, your honor." 
riOirill **23 Clearly, Defendant invited 
the alleged error he now appeals by 
repeatedly stipulating to the fact that he had 
a prior conviction for possession. The 
rationale behind this stipulation is clear: 
regardless of whether the prior conviction 
was for simple possession or possession 
with intent to distribute, the prior conviction 
enhanced the Defendant's sentence. 
Therefore, because Defendant invited the 
error he now appeals, we will not review it. 
{FN31 
CONCLUSION 
**24 The reasonable doubt jury instruction 
given at Defendant's trial is not manifestly 
unjust because it correctly conveyed the 
concept of reasonable doubt to the jury. 
Further, because Defendant invited the error, 
we decline to address Defendant's claim that 
his sentence enhancement is somehow 
erroneous because of a clerical error in 
Defendant's prior judgment. 
**25 WE CONCUR: RUSSELL W. 
BENCH, Presiding Judge PAMELA T. 
GREENWOOD, Associate Presiding Judge. 
FN1. Based on the invited error 
doctrine, the Utah Supreme Court 
has stated that "if counsel, either by 
statement or act, affirmatively 
represented to the court that he or 
she had no objection to the jury 
instruction, we will not review the 
instruction under the manifest 
injustice exception." State v. 
Hamilton, 2003 UT 22,f 54, 70 P.3d 
111. In this case, defense counsel not 
only failed to object to the 
reasonable doubt jury instruction, but 
also expressly agreed to the 
reasonable doubt jury instruction. 
Utah law has not addressed whether 
the invited error doctrine applies 
when there has been a change of 
settled law. However, federal law 
states that "[w]here a defendant 
submits proposed jury instructions in 
reliance on current law, and on direct 
appeal that law is declared 
constitutionally infirm, we will not 
apply the invited error doctrine. 
Instead, we will review for plain 
error." United States v. West Indies 
Transv., Inc., 127 F.3d 299, 305 (3d 
Cir.1997). Because we similarly 
acknowledge an exception to the 
preservation rule for exceptional 
circumstances "where a change in 
law or the settled interpretation of 
law colored the failure to have raised 
an issue at trial," State v. Irwin, 924 
P.2d 5, 10 (Utah Ct.App.1996), we 
do not apply the invited error 
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doctrine here. 
FN2. In State v. Cruz, 2005 UT 45, 
122 P.3d 543, the Utah Supreme 
Court reviewed reasonable doubt 
jury instructions that included the 
phrase "dispel all reasonable doubt" 
and found that those instructions 
were not erroneous. Id. atf | IK 18. 
Because "dispel all reasonable 
doubt" and "eliminate all reasonable 
doubt" are functionally equivalent, 
Defendant's reasonable doubt jury 
instruction is not erroneous. 
judgment would still be final and 
effective for the purposes of 
enhancing Defendant's sentence. 
. . . P.3d — , 2006 WL 947754 (Utah App.), 
549 Utah Adv. Rep. 21, 2006 UT App 142 
END OF DOCUMENT 
FN3. In the alternative, Defendant 
argues that his counsel rendered 
ineffective assistance because he 
counseled Defendant to stipulate to 
the prior conviction. However, even 
if we were to find defense counsel's 
assistance defective for this reason, 
Defendant cannot prove that "but for 
counsel's deficient performance [,] 
there is a reasonable probability that 
the outcome ... would have been 
different." Wickham v. Galetka, 2002 
UT72,f 19, 61P.3d978 (quotations 
and citation omitted). Rule 30(b) of 
the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure states that "[clerical 
mistakes in judgments ... may be 
corrected by the court at any time 
and after such notice, if any, as the 
court may order." Utah R.Crim. P. 
30(b) (emphasis added). Moreover, a 
clerical error, once determined, can 
be amended and made "effective as 
of a prior date so that the record 
accurately reflects that which took 
place." Preece v. Preece, 682 P.2d 
298, 299 (Utah 1984). Because both 
the trial court and the parties agreed 
that the error in the prior judgment 
was simply clerical, the prior 
© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For 
Official Publication) 
BENCH, Presiding Judge: 
*1 Defendant Graham Woodruff Austin 
argues, under the standard set forth in State 
v. Reyes, 2005 UT 33, \ 30, 116 P.3d 305, 
that part of the reasonable doubt jury 
instruction--" [i]t is the burden of the State to 
eliminate all reasonable doubt"--violated his 
due process rights. Because Defendant did 
not object to the reasonable doubt jury 
instruction at trial, he asserts plain error on 
appeal. See State v. Halls, 2006 UT App 
142, 1 1 13- 14. "Under the first prong of 
the plain error standard, Defendant must 
show that '[a]n error exists." ' Id. at f 15 
(alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
"[I]f Defendant's reasonable doubt jury 
instruction, taken as a whole, ... correctly 
convey[ed] the concept of reasonable doubt 
to the jury, then it was not erroneous." Id. at 
f 16 (omission and second alteration in 
original) (quotations and citations omitted). 
In the instant matter, the "reasonable doubt 
jury instruction given at Defendant's trial did 
not convey the message that the State must 
only eliminate those doubts that are 
sufficiently defined; neither did the State 
argue that the juror need articulate and 
eliminate specific doubts." Id. at Tf 19. As 
we held in Halls, "we are not persuaded that 
the use of 'eliminate all reasonable doubt" ' 
constitutes plain error. Id. at J^ 20. We 
conclude that the jury instruction, "taken as 
a whole, correctly communicate[d] the 
principle of reasonable doubt." State v. Cruz, 
2005UT45,f 21,122P.3d543. 
Defendant also asserts that the trial court 
erred by (1) imposing consecutive sentences 
without the benefit of a presentence 
investigation report (PSI) and (2) failing to 
adequately consider Defendant's history, 
remorse, and rehabilitative needs in 
violation of Utah Code section 76-3-401(2), 
see Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(2) (2003). 
"Prior to the imposition of any sentence, the 
court may, with the concurrence of the 
defendant, continue the date for the 
imposition of sentence ... for the purpose of 
obtaining a[PSI] ... or information from 
other sources about the defendant." Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-18-l(5)(a) (Supp.2005) 
(emphasis added). [FN1] This statute gives 
the trial court discretion to impose a 
sentence without ordering a PSI. See State v. 
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Madsen. 2002 UT App 345, If f 13-15, 57 
P.3d 1134. Additionally, Defendant 
specifically requested that the trial court 
"waive his time for sentencing and be 
sentenced today/' knowing that no PSI 
would be completed. The trial court granted 
Defendant's request and sentenced him 
immediately after the trial concluded. 
Therefore, the trial court did not err in 
sentencing Defendant without the benefit of 
a PSI. 
FN1. There have been no relevant 
amendments to the applicable 
statutes since Defendant's 
commission of the crimes in this 
matter. For convenience, we 
therefore cite to the most recent 
version of the statutes. 
Further, in determining whether to impose 
consecutive sentences, the trial court is 
required to "consider the gravity and 
circumstances of the offenses, the number of 
victims, and the history, character, and 
rehabilitative needs of the defendant." Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-3-40\(2). Defendant asserts 
that the trial court was unable to sufficiently 
consider "his history, his remorse, and his 
rehabilitative needs," in large part because a 
PSI had not been completed. 
*2 "Although the trial court did not 
explicitly address the enumerated factors in 
section ["76-3-40If2) ], there is ample 
evidence in the record that the court 
considered these factors at the time of 
Defendant's sentencing." State v. 
Valdovinos, 2003 UT App 432, Tj 30, 82 
P.3d 1167. The trial court here received 
evidence concerning Defendant's drug 
addiction, the recent hospitalization of his 
mother, his failing marriage, his recent 
unemployment, and his car braking down. 
The trial court also received evidence 
concerning Defendant's immediate remorse, 
his apology to the victim's family at trial, 
and the victim impact statements. As a 
result, we hold that the trial court 
sufficiently considered all of the sentencing 
factors and did not abuse its discretion by 
imposing consecutive sentences. 
Furthermore, Defendant's claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel is without 
merit because counsel was not "objectively 
deficient" in not objecting to the lack of a 
PSI and to the imposition of consecutive 
sentences. State v. Mecham, 2000 UT App 
247, f 21,9P.3d777. 
Accordingly, we affirm. 
WE CONCUR: PAMELA T. 
GREENWOOD, Associate Presiding Judge 
and JAMES Z. DAVIS, Judge. 
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GREENWOOD, Associate Presiding Judge: 
Defendant Robert Carl Terry appeals his conviction for two 
counts of possession of clandestine laboratory precursors while 
in possession of a firearm, a first degree felony. See Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 58-37d-4(l)(a), -5(1)(a) (2004). On appeal, Defendant 
argues that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance. 
Defendant also argues that the trial court's failure to 
adequately instruct the jury concerning a lesser-included offense 
was plain error. We affirm. 
Defendant first asserts that he was denied effective 
assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to request 
jury instructions on a lesser-included offense. Specifically, 
Defendant contends that there was a rational basis for the jury 
to acquit him of the enhanced charge of clandestine laboratory 
precursors and instead convict him of the lesser-included offense 
of possession of a controlled substance precursor. See id. 
§§ 58-37c-3(12)(k), -19(2), -20(1) (2002). An ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim raised for the first time on appeal 
is reviewed as a question of law. See State v. Clark, 2004 UT 
25,16, 89 P.3d 162. 
To show ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must 
satisfy both prongs of a test established by the United States 
Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 
(1984). To meet the first prong, a defendant must show that 
counsel's performance was deficient and that specific acts or 
omissions fell below an objective standard of reasonable 
performance. See State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76,519, 12 P. 3d 
92; Moench v. State, 2004 UT App 57,121, 88 P.3d 353. To satisfy 
the second prong, a defendant must show that he was prejudiced by 
counsel's deficient performance. See id. 
To bolster his argument that his counsel's performance was 
deficient, Defendant cites State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152 (Utah 
1983), for the proposition that a defendant's request for lesser-
included offense instructions must be granted if (1) the offenses 
are related because the statutory elements overlap and the 
evidence at trial involves proof of some or all of those 
overlapping elements; and (2) the evidence provides a "rational 
basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense 
charged and convicting him of the included offense." Id. at 159 
(quoting Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(4) (2003)). 
The propriety of a lesser-included offense instruction is 
determined by the evidence presented at trial. See State v. 
Kruger, 2000 UT 60,514, 6 P.3d 1116 (stating that the trial court 
must decide whether there is a "sufficient quantum of evidence" 
to ascertain whether a rational basis exists to "support both 
acquittal of the greater and conviction of the lesser offense"). 
In the instant case, Defendant provides only cursory references 
to the record and fails to cite relevant authority or caselaw to 
support his claim that, if requested, a lesser-included offense 
instruction would have been appropriate in this case. 
Consequently, Defendant fails to show how the jury would have had 
a "rational basis," Baker, 671 P.2d at 159, to acquit Defendant 
of clandestine laboratory precursors and instead convict him of 
the lesser-included charge of possession of a controlled 
substance precursor. Therefore, Defendant's reliance on Baker is 
unavailing. 
Moreover, Defendant's failure to demonstrate that this case 
was appropriate for a lesser-included offense instruction defeats 
his argument that trial counsel's performance did not meet an 
objective standard of reasonable performance. See Litherland, 
2000 UT 76 at 519. At trial, defense counsel's strategy was to 
demonstrate that the State had failed to prove that Defendant was 
involved in any crime, not that Defendant was guilty of the 
lesser-included charge of a controlled substance precursor. Such 
a strategy does not constitute ineffective assistance. See State 
v. Perry, 899 P.2d 1232, 1241 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (rejecting 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim where trial counsel could 
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reasonably have chosen not to request lesser-included aggravated 
assault instruction to avoid weakening kidnaping defense). We 
necessarily apply a highly deferential standard of review to 
trial counsel's performance. See State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 
461, 466 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) . Failure to do so "would produce 
too great a temptation to second-guess trial counsel's 
performance on the basis of an inanimate record." Id. Applying 
a deferential standard to the facts at hand, we note that trial 
counsel's strategy not to seek lesser-included instructions could 
have been "sound trial strategy." Litherland, 2000 UT 76 at 119 
(quotations and citation omitted). Therefore, we conclude that 
trial counsel did not fall below an objective standard of 
reasonable performance.1 
Defendant additionally argues that the trial court's failure 
to sua sponte instruct the jury about the lesser-included offense 
of possession of a clandestine laboratory precursor was plain 
error. To establish plain error, an appellant must show (1) the 
existence of an error; (2) that the error should have been 
obvious to the trial court; and (3) that the error harmed the 
appellant and absent such error a more favorable outcome was 
reasonably likely. See State v. Nelson-Wacrcroner, 2004 UT 29,116, 
94 P.3d 186 (Utah 2004) . A plain error claim is a question of 
law, which we review for correctness. See Krucrer, 2000 UT 60 at 
Sill. 
It is well settled that a court has no independent duty to 
give a lesser-included instruction unless a defendant so 
requests. See State v. Howell, 649 P.2d 91, 94 (Utah 1982); 
State v. Mitchell, 3 Utah 2d 70, 278 P.2d 618, 621 (1955). 
Hence, to the extent Defendant argues that the trial court's 
failure to independently give such an instruction was error, his 
argument fails. 
Moreover, because Defendant cannot show that counsel's 
failure to request lesser-included instructions was not the 
result of a strategic decision to seek acquittal on all charges, 
we need not further consider his plain-error argument. See State 
because Defendant cannot meet the first prong of the test 
enunciated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), 
we need not consider the second prong. See State v. Diaz, 2 002 
UT App 288,138, 55 P. 3d 1131. However, even if we were to 
consider the second prong, Defendant would be unable to 
demonstrate that counsel's alleged deficient performance 
prejudiced the outcome of his case. Defendant fails to cite to 
the record or proffer evidence to show he was prejudiced by trial 
counsel's performance. As a result, Defendant does not meet the 
second prong of the Strickland test. 
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v. Winfield. 2006 UT 4,8114, 128 P.3d 1171 (explaining that "we 
have declined to engage in even plain error review when counsel, 
either by statement or act, affirmatively represented to the 
[trial] court that he or she had no objection to the 
[proceedings].") (alterations in original) (quotations and 
citation omitted); State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107, 1109 (Utah 
1996) ("We have held repeatedly that on appeal, a party cannot 
take advantage of an error committed at trial when that party led 
the trial court into committing the error." (quotations and 
citation omitted)). In this instance, we reiterate that 
counsel's failure to object to the jury instructions could have 
been the product of a "conscious decision to refrain from 
[seeking an instruction]." State v. Hall, 946 P.2d 712, 716 
(Utah Ct. App. 1997) (quotations and citation omitted). Hence, 
Defendant's plain error argument also fails. 
We affirm. 
Pamela T. Greenwood, 
Associate Presiding Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
James Z. Davis, Judge 
Carolyn B. McHugh, Judge 
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